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ARKANSAS JUVENILE COURTS: DO LAY JUDGES
SATISFY DUE PROCESS IN DELINQUENCY CASES?
Paula J. Casey*
INTRODUCTION
A separate criminal jurisprudence for children was unheard of
until the twentieth century. Prior to the creation of juvenile courts
at the beginning of this century, children who were charged with
crimes were subjected to adult criminal proceedings. The belief that
the causes of delinquency could be predicted and treated so as to
prevent deviant behavior in children fostered reforms in the applica-
tion of criminal law to juveniles.' These reforms eventually resulted
in the creation of juvenile courts.' The first juvenile courts resem-
bled social agencies and were designed to protect and rehabilitate
rather than punish juveniles who were charged with crimes. Juve-
nile proceedings, which were not structured as adversarial proceed-
ings, were often summary and informal with juveniles forfeiting due
process safeguards.' There was little need for a juvenile court judge
to be trained in the law. While the pretrial4 and disposition5 phases
of the juvenile process are often informal today, the United States
Supreme Court has now mandated that the trial or adjudication of
juvenile defendants must meet virtually all of the due process re-
quirements for adult offenders.6 As a result there is clearly a need
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Arkansas at Little Rock School of Law.
1. See S. Fox, Juvenile Justice Reform: An Historical Perspective, 22 STAN. L. REV.
1187 (1970) (hereinafter cited as Fox); A. PLATr, THE CHILD SAVERS: THE INVENTION OF
DELINQUENCY (1969).
2. The first juvenile court was created in Illinois in 1899, Illinois Juvenile Court Act,
1899 IUl. Laws 133.
3. See Rendleman, Parens Patriae, From Chancery to the Juvenile Court, 23 S.C.L.
REV. 205 (1971).
4. In Arkansas, conferences are held by an intake officer with the juvenile and his or
her parents or guardian to discuss the complaint which has been made against the juvenile.
Under certain circumstances, a delinquency case may be diverted from court and the juve-
nile may be placed on an informal type of probation. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 45-411.1. (Supp.
1983).
5. Disposition alternatives in Arkansas include changing custody of the juvenile, treat-
ment and counseling programs, physical, psychological and psychiatric evaluations, proba-
tion commitment to juvenile facilities, payment of costs, fines, and restitution, and
participation in public service programs. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 45-436 (Supp. 1983).
6. The right to notice of the changes to appointed counsel, to confront and cross-ex-
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for juvenile court judges to be trained in the law.
The history of juvenile courts in Arkansas, which is reviewed in
the first part of this article, provides a basis for understanding why
juvenile jurisdiction was originally vested with lay judges. The sec-
ond part of the article discusses the problems of the juvenile system
today, including both the practices of juvenile courts and the prac-
tice of juveniles being charged directly in the adult criminal system.
Since many of the problems of the juvenile system are a result of
jurisdiction being vested in the county courts with lay judges, the
last portion of the article examines the use of lay judges in juvenile
courts and concludes that the vesting of jurisdiction with lay judges
cannot be justified on the basis of existing United States Supreme
Court decisions.
HISTORY OF JUVENILE LAW IN ARKANSAS
At the turn of the century, juvenile law reform was occurring
throughout the United States as well as in Arkansas. Prior to 1905,
a juvenile convicted of a criminal offense in Arkansas was subject to
the same penalties as an adult.7 As a result, such children were
often confined in the state penitentiary. In 1901 and 1903 the Gov-
ernor asked the legislature to establish reform schools for juveniles
as an alternative to incarcerating them in adult prisons., Finally in
1905 the legislature approved a bill to establish the first reform
school in the state.9 For the next few years children who were
charged with crimes were tried in adult courts and presumably re-
ceived the same procedural safeguards as adults in criminal pro-
ceedings. Judges had the option of sentencing children who were
convicted of crimes either to the reform school or prisons. 10 Remov-
amine witnesses as well as the privilege against self-incrimination were recognized in In re
Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967). The standard of proof in a delinquency case is beyond a reason-
able doubt. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970). Juveniles are also protected by the double
jeopardy clause. Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519 (1975); The right to trial by jury has not been
extended to juveniles. McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528 (1971).
7. At common law, children between the ages of 7 and 14 were presumed to be incapa-
ble of discerning between good and evil. By statute, children in Arkansas could not be
found guilty of a crime if they were under the age of 12. GANTT'S DIGEST, § 1230. Between
the ages of 12 and 14, the common law presumption prevailed and the burden was on the
state to prove that the child was capable of forming the necessary intent. Dove v. State, 37
Ark. 261 (1881).
8. Address of the Governor to the Thirty-Fourth Session of the Legislature, J. OF THE
HOUSE OF REP. OF THE STATE OF ARK. 28 at 33, 48 (1903).
9. Act of April 25, 1905, 1905 Ark. Acts 199; for a history of Arkansas' first reform
schools see ARKANSAS AND IT'S PEOPLE-A HISTORY, 449-504 (Thomas ed. 1930).
10. Act of April 25, 1905, 1905 Ark. Acts 199.
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hmg children from adult prisons was a step forward although some
convicted juveniles might have disagreed since the alternatives for
the juvenile under the old system were not necessarily prison or re-
form school but rather prison or freedom. Many courts were under-
standably reluctant to sentence convicted juveniles to state prisons.
Even when a juvenile was sentenced to prison there was an ex-
tremely good possibility of a governor's pardon, at least during the
terms of one governor. I Perhaps the real motivation for the reform
school legislation was not so much the rehabilitation and reform of
juveniles as it was to get the convicted juveniles off the streets and
confine them.
In 1907 the Arkansas General Assembly passed an act entitled
"An act for the better maintenance and bringing up of certain chil-
dren.""2 The act was apparently an attempt to prevent delinquency
by placing children who met certain criteria 3 that were considered
to be predictive of delinquency in reform school or foster homes.
County judges were authorized to commit children to the reform
school who had not been convicted of violating any criminal law,
but were neglected.' 4 No attempt was made to segregate neglected
children from children who had committed criminal acts. Regard-
11. In his opening address to the Arkansas legislature in January, 1905, Governor Jeff
Davis said, "It has been my policy, in order to bring about a public discussion of this subject
and force a public knowledge of the necessity of this institution, to pardon all white boys
under the age of 18 confined in the penitentiary, regardless of the crime they had committed
.... During the four years I have been Governor there have been confined in all 115 white
boys under the age of 18, some as young as 12 years, for various crimes, from stealing
blooded chickens which their owners valued at fabulous prices, to assisting in bank robber-
ies, housebreaking and burglary. During the same period there have been confined 217
negroes under this age. There has also been confined for the same period and pardoned by
me about twenty white women charged with various crimes. I have pardoned these people
simply because it would be outrageous to confine them in an ordinary penitentiary with the
worst element of criminals in our State." J. OF THE HOUSE OF REP. OF THE STATE OF ARK.
28, 31 (1905).
12. Act of April 30, 1907, 1907 Ark. Acts 237, repealed by Act of March 18, 1975, 1975
Ark. Acts 451.
13. Pauperism was a condition that was considered to be predictive of delinquency. See
Fox, supra note 1, at 119.
14. The Act in its entirety reads, "That the county judges of the various counties in the
State of Arkansas be, and they are hereby authorized and required to have brought before
them all children between the ages of three and fifteen years, whom they know, and who are
reported to them to live in notorious resorts of bad character, or who frequent the company
of lewd, wanton, or lascivious persons, or whose parents live in or keep houses of illfame, or
habitually frequent the same; and if such judge is satisfied from the proof offered that such
child is not being properly cared for, and that its moral, mental or physical welfare is being
neglected to that extent that it will probably grow up in pauperism, lewdness and crime, the
said judge shall take charge of such child and by proper order commit it to the reform
school, if there is a vacancy from his county; or find it a suitable home, as in his judgment
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less of the reasons which brought them before the court, all were
subjected to the same penalties and dispositions.
No procedures were set out in the act and the county judge had
discretion to remove children from their homes subject only to re-
versal by a higher court. The judicial justification for such a system,
that afforded no procedural safeguards, was found in the concept of
parenspatriae.5 This concept places the state as the ultimate guard-
ian and protector of minor children. Because the state was acting as
a superior parent for children whose parents were considered neg-
lectful or unfit, and because the stated purpose of such acts was to
provide care for children and not to punish them, no due process
safeguards were considered necessary.1 6
In the Arkansas system ofparenspatriae, the county judge was
the patriarch. The powers of the judge were unique under the Ar-
kansas Constitution of 1874, because the county judge possessed ex-
ecutive, judicial and legislative authority.' 7 The county judge not
only controlled the purse strings, but was also the local administra-
tor of social welfare. Prior to 1938, the county judge was the judge
of the probate court 8 with jurisdiction over guardianships and in-
competents.' 9 This probate jurisdiction, combined with the jurisdic-
tion over paupers, vagrants, illegitimate children and apprenticeship
of minors2" made the county judge the caretaker of the county's
most helpless citizens. Viewed from this perspective, it is only logi-
cal that the state's first juvenile code2 1 placed jurisdiction of juvenile
matters in county court.22
The Juvenile Court Act of 191123 was unquestionably an im-
provement over the 1907 Act. A petition, notice and hearing were
required by the 1911 Act which recognized a right to counsel in de-
linquency cases.24 An amendment to the 1911 Act required prose-
will be to the best interest of the moral, mental, and physical welfare of such child. Act of
April 30, 1907, 1907 Ark. Acts 237, repealed by Act of March 18, 1975, 1975 Ark. Acts 451.
15. Parenspatriae means "'parent of the country' [and] refers traditionally to [the] role
of a state as sovereign and guardian of persons under legal disability.' BLACK'S LAW Dic-
TIONARY 1003 (rev. 5th ed. 1979).
16. See Fox, supra note 1, at 1192-93.
17. ARK. CONST. art. VII §§ 28, 30, 32, 37 (§30 superseded by amend. 55, 1974).
18. ARK. CONST. art. VII § 34 (amended 1938).
19. Id
20. ARK. CONST. art. VII § 28.
21. Act of April 25, 1911, 1911 Ark. Acts 215.
22. Id at § 2.
23. Act of April 25, 1911, 1911 Ark. Acts 215.
24. Id at § 11.
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cuting attorneys to assist the juvenile courts.25 Despite these
provisions which seem to indicate that juvenile court proceedings
resembled adult court proceedings, the criminal procedures that
children had been subjected to in adult courts were actually aban-
doned. The nature of the juvenile court hearing is perhaps best il-
lustrated by the language of the 1921 amendment to the 1911 act:
said proceedings shall at no time assume the form of an adver-
sary suit, or a legal combat between lawyers . ".. 26
The philosophy that juvenile courts were social welfare institu-
tions which demanded summary informal proceedings continued
for several decades. In the late 1960's and early 1970's, however, the
United States Supreme Court decided several cases which substan-
tially altered juvenile court procedures in delinquency cases. The
Supreme Court has never declared that delinquency adjudications
must conform to all the requirements of an adult criminal trial.27
However, the recognition of the right to adequate and timely notice
of charges, 28 appointed counsel,29 confrontation and cross-examina-
tion of witnesses, 30 protection against self-incrimination, 31 protec-
tion against double-jeopardy, 32 and proof beyond a reasonable
doubt33 have changed once informal delinquency hearings into ad-
versary proceedings.
The Supreme Court's recognition of procedural due process in
juvenile hearings prompted a revision of Arkansas law.34 In 1975, a
new juvenile code35 was adopted which repealed the prior juvenile
acts.36 The juvenile code of 1975 made some changes in juvenile
law 7 but jurisdiction of juvenile matters remained with the county
judge, 8 who is not required to be law trained.39
25. Act of March 25, 1921, 1921 Ark. Acts 404.
26. Id at §4.
27. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
28. Id. at 31-34.
29. Id at 34-42.
30. Id at 42-57.
31. Id
32. Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519 (1975).
33. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
34. G. PASVOGEL, ARKANSAS JUVENILE LAW AND PROCEDURES, 4 (1976).
35. Act of March 18, 1975, 1975 Ark. Acts. 451.
36. Act of April 30, 1907, 1907 Ark. Acts 237; Act of April 25, 1911, 1911 Ark. Acts 215
(repealed by Act of March 18, 1975, 1975 Ark. Acts 451).
37. One of the most significant changes was the requirement that newly appointed juve-
nile referees be licensed attorneys. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 45-409 (1977).
38. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 45-408 (1977).
39. A county judge is required to be at least twenty-five years of age, be a United States
1983] 505
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The committee that drafted the juvenile code of 1975, like
others before them' and after them,4 "recognized the critical need
for vesting jurisdiction over juvenile matters in judicial courts pre-
sided over by legally trained judicial officers .. ,. 2 However, be-
cause of a decision of the Arkansas Supreme Court in 191941 which
upheld the vesting of jurisdiction of juvenile matters in county
courts, the Committee decided to leave jurisdiction unchanged.44
citizen, possess upright character and a good business education and be a resident of the
county and the state. ARK. CONST. art. VII § 29.
40. 0. Fendler, The Arkansas Judicial System at the Crossroads, 17 ARK. L. REV. 259,
271 (1963).
41. D. Shackleford, Arkansas Bar Association, Testimony on the Position of the Arkan-
sas Bar Association on Juvenile Courts before the Subcomm. on the Juvenile Court System
(Sept. 16, 1983).
42. G. PASVOGEL, ARKANSAS JUVENILE LAW AND PROCEDURES, 11 (1976).
43. Ex Parte King, 141 Ark. 213, 217 S.W. 465 (1919). In King the Arkansas Supreme
Court found the Juvenile Court Act of 1911 to be constitutional. The Court first determined
that the intention of the General Assembly was to place subject matter jurisdiction of the
disposition of minors in county court, not to create a new court which would clearly be
prohibited by the Arkansas law. Ark. Const. art. VII § 1. Whether county court's jurisdic-
tion over delinquency proceedings is constitutional today is at least questionable. In King
the court applied the doctrine of e]sdem generis to construe Article VII, Section 28 of the
Arkansas Constitution. The doctrine of e/usdem generis is "that when general words follow
an enumeration of particular things such words must be held to include only such things
• ..as those specifically enumerated." King, 141 Ark. at 224, 217 S.W. at 468-69. The court
determined that the general words, "in every other case that may be necessary... to the
local concerns of the respective counties," which followed the specific enumeration of the
county courts' jurisdiction over paupers, bastardy, vagrants and the apprenticeship of mi-
nors provided the specific authority for placing jurisdiction of dependent, neglected and
delinquent juveniles in county court. Thus the court found that dependent, neglected and
delinquent juveniles were of the same character as paupers, bastards, vagrants and appren-
ticeship of minors. Before reaching that conclusion the court noted that the General Assem-
bly did not intend to confer upon the county courts the power to institute criminal
proceedings or punish juveniles for alleged violations of law. Rather, the purpose of the act
was to reclaim, reform and protect minor children. Id at 220, 217 S.W. at 467. See also
Ward School Bus Mfg., Inc. v. Fowler, 261 Ark. 100, 547 S.W.2d 394 (1977). The United
States Supreme Court held in In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967), that delinquency proceedings
which may lead to commitment in a state institution must be regarded as criminal proceed-
ings for some purposes. 387 U.S. at 49. Under current Arkansas law, a juvenile can only be
adjudicated as a delinquent for violation of a criminal law. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 45-403(2)
(Supp. 1983). The General Assembly has declared that one of the purposes of the Juvenile
Code is to "correct" children. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 45-402.1 (Supp. 1983). A delinquency
adjudication may result in commitment to a state institution as well as a jail term. ARK.
STAT. ANN. § 45-436(3)(b)(ii)&(iv)(Supp. 1983) and See infra note 115 and accompanying
text.
County courts have never been vested with criminal jurisdiction of any type. If delin-
quency proceedings are criminal proceedings, or perhaps even quasi-criminal proceedings,
and an adjudication of delinquency can result in punishment, then vesting jurisdiction in
county court can no longer be justified on the basis of the King decision.
44. G. PASVOGEL, Arkansas Juvenile Law and Procedures, 11 (1976).
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Since juvenile courts were first created in this state, juvenile law
has changed and the functions of the county judges and county
courts have changed but the structure of juvenile courts has not.
Due process safeguards have been super-imposed upon the informal
proceedings which were once accepted as the juvenile version of j us-
tice. The judicial authority of the county judge has been diminished
by the transfer of probate jurisdiction to chancellors.4 5 The struc-
ture of county government was reorganized by a constitutional
amendment adopted in 1974, 46 creating hope that the county judge
would be completely divested of judicial authority.47 These changes
in juvenile law and county government have not yet affected the
structure of juvenile courts. Thus, the history of juvenile courts in
Arkansas essentially ends where it began.
Arkansas Juvenile Courts Today
Juvenile courts exist today in each of the state's seventy-five
counties. 48  County judges are actually presiding over juvenile
courts in approximately one-fourth of the counties.4 9 Referees, who
are appointed by the county judges and serve at their pleasure, 50 are
presiding over juvenile courts in the remainder of the counties.5
All referees appointed after 1975 must be licensed attorneys.52 Lay
referees, appointed prior to 1975, continue to hold juvenile courts in
at least two counties.53
It is difficult to monitor juvenile court procedures and the pro-
cess which allows juveniles to be charged in adult courts rather than
juvenile courts. Juvenile court proceedings have traditionally been
45. ARK. CONST. amend. 24.
46. ARK. CONST. amend. 55.
47. Amendment 55 to the Arkansas Constitution was approved by the voters in Novem-
ber, 1974. The wording of the amendment was pulled from the proposed constitution of
1970. There was some thought that the amendment would actually remove all judicial juris-
diction from the county court. If the entire constitutional proposal had been adopted, that
would have been the case since the jurisdiction of county courts would have been vested in
"County Trial Courts." Proposed ARK. CONST. of 1970, art. 5, § 7. However, Amendment
55 does not directly abolish the judicial functions of the county judge and in fact would
seem to leave Article 7, Section 28 of the 1874 Constitution intact. See Comment, County
Government Reorganization in Arkansas, 28 ARK. L. REV. 226 (1974).
48. 1982 JUDICIAL DEPT. OF ARK. ANN. REP. 124.
49. Fifty-six counties reported the appointment of juvenile referees in 1982. Id at 123.
50. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 45-408 (1977).
51. See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
52. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 45-409 (1977).
53. Cross, Prairie and Sebastion Counties have lay juvenile referees. 1982 JUDICIAL
DEPT. OF ARK. ANN. REP. 123. ARKANSAS LEGAL DIRECTORY (1982).
19831
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closed to the public in order to protect children from adverse public-
ity.54 The clerks of the county courts55 are required to submit re-
ports to the Judicial Department 6 but the reports seem to consist of
little more than the numbers of cases filed and terminated in any
given year. 5" The Division of Youth Services gathers more detailed
information through its Arkansas Statewide Juvenile Information
System. However, reporting through that system is done voluntarily
by the courts and focuses on characteristics of the offenders, types of
offenses, and dispositions rather than on court procedures. 58
A recently published study59 reveals glimpses of court practices
which should have been abandoned years ago. 6°  The study com-
pares the practices of referees to county judges in advising juveniles
of their right to counsel and right to remain silent. Juveniles who
appeared without counsel were advised more often by referees than
county judges that they had a right to counsel.6I The right to be
represented by counsel is a meaningless right for most juveniles un-
less counsel is appointed by the court. County judges advised
juveniles of the right to appointed counsel 62 more often than did
referees. 63  The right against self-incrimination is applicable to
juveniles.' Although juveniles were almost routinely advised of the
right to remain silent by both county judges65 and by referees 66
juveniles were required to testify in approximately four out of every
54. In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 24; ARK. STAT. ANN. § 45-442 (1977) (juvenile hearings in
Arkansas may be opened at the discretion of the court).
55. The county clerk is the clerk of the juvenile court. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 45-405
(1977).
56. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 45-447 (1977).
57. See, e.g., 1982 JUDICIAL DEPT. OF ARK. ANN. REP. 124.
58. See 1981 DIVISION OF YOUTH SERVICES ANN. REP.
59. Ark. Advocates for Children and Families, Due Process Rights and Legal Proce-
dures in Arkansas Juvenile Courts (1983) [hereinafter cited as Study].
60. The study, which was undertaken to evaluate the judicial practices of the juvenile
courts in Arkansas, is based on the observation by trained volunteers of 492 delinquency
and juvenile in need of supervision cases in 46 counties. Two juvenile courts refused to
participate; 26 courts had too few cases during the observation period to be included in the
survey. Study, supra note 59, at 1.
61. Referees advised juveniles of right to counsel in 84.4% of the 191 cases surveyed,
county judges in only 66.1%. Study, supra note 59, at 36.
62. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 45-413 (Supp. 1983).
63. County judges advised juveniles of right to appointed counsel in 44.9% of the 198
cases surveyed, referees in only 26.2% of cases. Study, supra note 59, at 36, Table 1.
64. In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 55.
65. Eighty seven and eight tenths percent (87.8%) of 272 hearings. Study, supra note 59,
at 38, Table 3.
66. Seventy-one and three tenths percent (71.3%) of 272 hearings. Study, supra note 59,
at 38, Table 3.
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ten hearings. County judges required juveniles to testify almost
twice as often as did referees. 67
The State's evidence against juveniles was not presented by
prosecuting attorneys in the majority of the cases surveyed. Despite
the statutory obligation for prosecuting attorneys to present evi-
dence in juvenile courts when requested by the court68 juvenile pro-
bation officers presented the State's case almost twice as often as did
prosecutors.69 The more disturbing finding is that in over 17% of the
total cases surveyed, the county judge or referee-that "fair and im-
partial trier of fact"-actually presented the state's case.7°
The study paints a dismal picture of juvenile courts in Arkan-
sas. Juveniles are told that they may remain silent and are then
required to testify. A presumption of innocence is ignored and
juveniles are required to prove their innocence before the state even
presents its case.7' More often than not, the state's case is presented
by someone other than a prosecutor and too frequently that other
someone is the judge. Witnesses are allowed to testify without being
sworn. 72 Defendants are not allowed to cross examine the witnesses
against them in some cases.73 The history of informal, nonadver-
sarial juvenile proceedings is not history in Arkansas, it is current
practice. These judicial practices exist despite the fact that the
United States Supreme Court has held that the fourteenth amend-
ment and the Bill of Rights applies to juveniles.74
Although due process safeguards have been extended to
juveniles, the safeguards have been nullified by actual Arkansas
court practices. Arkansas' first juvenile code provided for appoint-
67. County judges required testimony of juveniles in 61.9% of cases surveyed, referees
in 33.6%. Study, supra note 59, at 40, Table 4.
68. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 45-412 (1977).
69. Probation officers presented the state's case in 39.6% of the cases surveyed, prosecu-
tors in 20.2%. This table includes delinquency and JINS plea hearings, adjudication hear-
ings, and hearings in which either or both are a component. Study, supra note 59, at 42,
Table 5.
70. The State's case was presented by representatives of Social Services, police officers,
guardians-ad-litem, etc., in the other 23% of the total cases. Study, supra note 59, at 42,
Table 5.
71. Although the state presented its case first in 94% of the total cases, in cases where
the county judge was the presiding officer, the state presented its case first only 68.4% of the
time. Study, supra note 59, at 44, Table 6.
72. Witnesses were not sworn in 27.6% of the total cases surveyed. Study, supra note 59,
at 54, Table 12.
73. Defense not allowed to question in 27.1% of hearings; county judges presided in
45.9%, referees in 24% of hearings where defense not allowed to question. Study supra n. 59
at 54, Table 12.
74. In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 12.
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ment of defense counsel in delinquency cases,7 5 as does the current
juvenile code.7 6 The prosecuting attorney has a duty to assist in ju-
venile court when requested by the court," but his appearance in
juvenile court is infrequent. The practice of law in state courts by
lay persons is, of course, prohibited by law.78 Yet, probation officers
are representing the state in the majority of the cases surveyed.
Solving the problems of juvenile court practices will obviously re-
quire more than simply changing laws. Some juvenile courts, for
whatever reasons, are ignoring existing laws.
Another study reveals an additional failing of Arkansas' juve-
nile justice system which does not lie directly in the juvenile court
proceedings, but rather in the procedures which allow juveniles to
be routinely charged and tried in the adult court system. Juveniles
who are fifteen, sixteen, and seventeen years of age may be tried for
criminal offenses in either juvenile or adult court. Adult courts also
have concurrent jurisdiction with juvenile courts over juveniles who
are at least fourteen years of age and are charged with first degree
murder, second degree murder or rape.79 The prosecuting attorney
has discretion to determine where juveniles arrested without war-
rants are to be tried.80  A survey8 of juvenile cases in fifty-eight
Arkansas counties showed that approximately 47% of the cases in-
volving juvenile defendants were processed through adult courts in
198 1.82 Twenty-four of the counties surveyed processed more
juveniles through adult courts than through juvenile courts.8 3 The
offenses with which juveniles were charged in adult courts ranged in
seriousness from violations to felonies. However, the vast majority
of the offenses were drug and alcohol related or crimes against prop-
erty.84 Despite a prosecutorial policy in Pulaski County of only re-
75. Act of April 25, 1911, 1911 Ark. Acts 215.
76. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 45-413 (Supp. 1983).
77. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 45-412 (1977).
78. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 25-101-106 (1962 & Supp. 1983).
79. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 41-617 (Supp. 1983).
80. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 45-418 (Supp. 1983). Juveniles arrested with warrants are to be
taken before the court which issued the warrants. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 45-417 (Supp. 1983).
81. Division of Youth Services, Arkansas Youth in Municipal, Circuit and Juvenile
Courts (1981) (hereinafter cited as Survey).
82. In the 58 counties surveyed there were 4,587 cases processed through circuit and
municipal courts and 5,054 cases in juvenile courts. Survey, supra note 81, at 4.
83. Survey, supra note 81, at 16.
84. Of the 4,587 juvenile cases surveyed in adult court, only 332 or 7.2% were crimes
against people, i.e. murder (11), rape (24), aggravated robbery, (58), robbery (17), kidnap-
ping (4), aggravated assault (15), sexual abuse (2), terroristic threats (19), assault/battery
(182). Survey, supra note 81, at 9.
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ferring violent crimes by juvenile offenders to adult courts, 5 64.6%
of the juveniles who were old enough to be charged in adult courts
in Pulaski County were tried in adult courts.8 6 Only 12.6% of the
64.6% of juveniles sent to adult courts were charged with violent
crimes.87 The wide range of disposition alternatives, designed to
provide treatment and rehabilitation not only to juveniles but also
to their families, are not utilized by adult courts.88 Juveniles con-
victed in adult courts may be incarcerated in adult facilities or the
record of conviction may increase the possibility of incarceration for
subsequent offenses. 89 The State's policy of treating juveniles as
misdirected, misguided youths rather than criminals9" obviously
fails when juveniles are diverted from the juvenile system into the
adult criminal courts.
There are several possible explanations for the high number of
juveniles tried in the adult system but it is difficult to support con-
clusions on the basis of available information. The lack of clearly
defined procedures for juvenile courts may discourage attempts to
process juveniles through that system. Prosecuting attorneys may be
reluctant to refer juveniles to juvenile courts because prosecuting
attorneys do not participate in a majority of the juvenile courts'
cases. It is also possible that prosecuting attorneys, who were given
the discretion to decide whether to charge juveniles in adult courts
because of the prosecuting attorneys' legal training,91 are allowing
law enforcement officers to make the charging decisions. 92 A critical
examination of juvenile court structure, including the vesting of
subject matter jurisdiction with lay judges, may provide not only the
85. Statement of D. Bentley, Prosecuting Attorney for the Sixth Judicial District, Hear-
ing Before the Subcomm. on Juvenile Cout System, 7 (minutes of Aug. 3, 1983).
86. Dept. of Human Services, Division of Youth Services (unpublished raw data col-
lected for Survey, supra note 81).
87. Of the 905 juveniles charged in adult court in Pulaski County in 1981, 5 were
charged with murder, 5 with rape, 27 with aggravated robbery, 12 with robbery, 1 with
kidnapping, 6 with aggravated assault, 2 with sexual abuse, 16 with terroristic threatening,
and 40 with assault/battery. Dept. of Human Services, Division of Youth Services (unpub-
lished raw data collected for Survey, supra note 81).
88. See Arkansas Advocates for Children and Families, ARREST AND DISPOSITION OF
JUVENILES IN ARKANSAS CIRCUIT COURTS: SUMMARY (1983).
89. See ARK. STAT. ANN. § 43-2328 (1977).
90. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 45-402 (1977).
91. G. PASVOGEL, ARKANSAS JUVENILE LAW AND PROCEDURES, 18 (1976).
92. B. Jones, Chief of Police of Fayetteville, Arkansas, Minutes of the Hearing Before
the Subcomm. on Juvenile Court System, 9 (Aug. 3, 1983) (Chief Jones testified that 90% of
the time the officer decides whether to charge juveniles in adult or juvenile courts.)
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solution to some of the problems but also the means to implement
the solution.
Challenging Lay Judges in Juvenile Courts
Educational qualifications for the judiciary can vary between
courts and from state to state. The vast majority of all states require
by Constitutional or statutory provisions that judges of appellate
courts or courts of general criminal jurisdiction be lawyers. 93 How-
ever, the qualifications for judges of inferior courts vary drastically
from state to state94 and sometimes even within a state." A number
of challenges to the use of lay judges has resulted in some courts
abolishing the use of lay judges96 while other courts have upheld lay
judge systems.97
Challenges to lay judge systems have been based on either a
criminal defendant's sixth amendment right to counsel or fourteenth
amendment right to a fair trial. Since the accused has a right to the
assistance of counsel in criminal prosecutions,98 and the right ex-
tends to all defendants who face the possibility of incarceration,99
the denial of counsel in a criminal proceeding is a denial of due
process. The assistance of counsel is rendered meaningless if the
judge is incapable of understanding the arguments of counsel. The
second argument is based on the premise that the failure to provide
a competent judicial officer is a denial of a fair trial.
The California Supreme Court followed this reasoning in
Gordon v. Justice Court,l°° holding that the denial of a law-trained
judge to a defendant in a criminal proceeding where imprisonment
93. The exceptions are Massachusetts, New Hampshire, and North Carolina.
94. E.g., lay judges allowed, ARIz. CONST. art. VI, §§ 22, 32; ARK. CONST. art VII, §§ 6,
7, 16, 29, 40, 41; lay judges not allowed in criminal trial, Mo. CONST. art. V, § 25.
95. Eg., In New Hampshire, inferior courts must have lawyer-judges when lawyers are
available to serve. N.H. REv. STAT .ANN. § 502-A:3 (Repl. 1983).
96. State ex rel Anglin v. Mitchell, 596 S.W.2d 779 (Tenn. 1980); Gordon v. Justice
Court, 12 Cal. 3d 323, 525 P.2d 72, 115 Cal. Rptr. 632 (1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 938
(1975); State v. Dunkerley, 134 Vt. 523, 365 A.2d 131 (1976).
97. Masquelette v. State, 579 S.W.2d 478 (Tex. 1979) appeal dsmissed, 444 U.S. 986
(1979); Shoemaker v. Delaware, 375 A.2d 43 (Del. 1977); State ex rel. Reece v. Gies, 156 W.
Va. 729, 198 S.E.2d 211 (1973); Decatur v. Kushmer, 43 Ill. 2d 334, 253 N.E.2d 425 (1969);
Crouch v. Justice of the Peace Court, 7 Ariz. App. 460, 440 P.2d 1000 (1968); Kumar v.
Marion County Common Pleas Court, Div. of Dom. Rel., 704 F.2d 908 (6th Cir. 1983).
98. U.S. CONST. amend VI; Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
99. Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972).
100. 12 Cal. 3d 323, 525 P.2d 72, 115 Cal. Rptr. 632 (1974) cert. denied, 420 U.S. 938
(1975). See Comment, Gordon Y. Justice Court.: Defendant's Right to a Competent Tribunal, 2
HASTINGS CoNST. L. Q. 1177 (1975).
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is a possible punishment is a denial of due process. The opposing
and majority view is probably best articulated in Ditty v. Hamp-
ton' 10 where the court rejected the notion that "a right to be tried by
a lawyer judge grows out of the right to be defended by a lawyer."10 2
The court reasoned that since a judge does not perform the role of
an attorney in court, that is he neither prosecutes nor defends, there
is no need for him to be an attorney.10 3
The United States Supreme Court considered the issue of lay
judges in North v. Russell.1°4 In North, the Court upheld Ken-
tucky's use of lay judges in some inferior courts. Kentucky has a
two-tier court system with appeals from the first tier, the police
courts, tried de novo in the second-tier, circuit courts. Judges in all
circuit courts are required to be lawyers. Police court judges in
larger cities are also required to be lawyers but lay persons may
serve as police court judges in smaller cities.10 5 The defendant in
North, who was convicted of driving while intoxicated by a lay
judge in a police court, °6 did not appeal for a trial de novo but filed
a writ of habeas corpus in circuit court.
The defendant in North claimed that "when confinement is a
possible penalty, a law trained judge is required by the due process
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment whether or not a trial de novo
before a lawyer-judge is available."'0 7 The Court disposed of the
due process argument by finding that under the Kentucky system, a
law trained judge is provided in the appeal which is tried de novo.
Thus, a defendant is not convicted and imprisoned after a proceed-
ing which includes only a trial by a lay judge.'0
Several jurisdictions have relied on North to justify the contin-
uing use of lay judges in inferior courts.'°9 Only one court has con-
101. 490 S.W.2d 772 (Ky. 1972).
102. Id at 774.
103. See Comment, The Constitutionality of Nonattorney Judge Statutes, B.U.L. REV. 827
(1976).
104. 427 U.S. 328 (1976).
105. Id at 330.
106. Id at 329-30. Defendant was fined $150.00, his driver's license was revoked and he
was sentenced to 30 days in jail, despite the fact that no imprisonment was authorized for a
first offender.
107. Id at 333.
108. Id at 334. The Court left unanswered the question of whether a system which does
not provide for a trial de novo before a law trained judge after a conviction by a lay judge is
constitutionally permissible. Since Arkansas provides a trial de novo for appeals from juve-
nile courts, that question will not be explored in this article.
109. Young v. Konz, 88 Wash. 2d 276, 558 P.2d 791 (1977); Jenkins v. Canaan Municipal
Court, 116 N.H. 616, 366 A.2d 208 (1976).
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sidered the use of lay judges in felony cases and only one court has
considered the use of lay judges in juvenile courts. In State v.
Dunkerley,"l0 the Supreme Court of Vermont held that lay judges
may not participate in rulings on questions of law in criminal cases
because Vermont does not provide a trial de novo.I" The Tennes-
see Supreme Court, in State ex rel Anglin v. Mitchell,"2 distin-
guished the North case to hold that a lay judge may not deprive a
juvenile of his liberty despite the availability of a trial de novo. 3
The Use of Lay Judges in the Arkansas Juvenile Court after North
The first and most obvious distinction between the North case
and the Arkansas juvenile system is the difference between the sub-
ject matter jurisdiction of a police court and a juvenile court. In
North the court noted that the process requires scrutiny if confine-
ment is an available penalty," 4 but in doing so the court said
[T]here is a wide gap between the functions of a judge of court of
general jurisdiction, dealing with complex litigation, and the
functions of a local police court judge trying a typical 'drunk'
driver case or other traffic violations .... 115
The "gap" between the functions of a judge of general jurisdiction
and a juvenile court judge in Arkansas is not nearly so wide. In
fact, since a juvenile may be charged with felonies, misdemeanors or
violations" 6 the jurisdiction of a juvenile judge actually encom-
passes the jurisdiction of both a circuit judge and an inferior court
judge in this state." 7
110. 134 Vt. 423, 365 A.2d 131 (1976).
111. A panel of three judges, one of whom is law trained, preside over Vermont's supe-
rior courts, which have jurisdiction over felony cases. See Note, Do Al Judges Have to be
Lawyers? Side Judges in Vermont- The Case of State V. Dunkerley, 3 VT. L. REv. 147 (1978).
112. 596 S.W.2d 779 (Tenn. 1980).
113. See Le Clereq, The Constitutional Policy That Judges Be Learned in the Law, 47
TENN. L. REV. 689 (1980).
114. The penalties which can be imposed by a juvenile judge after a juvenile is found
guilty may not be so harsh as those available in adult courts for serious offenses, but a
juvenile may certainty be deprived of his liberty. A juvenile may be committed to the Divi-
sion of Youth Services (training school) or to a secure detention facility. ARK. STAT. ANN.
§ 45-436 (Supp. 1983). The Juvenile Code also provides for commitment to any other juve-
nile facility, presumably a jail with adequate provisions for detaining juveniles. ARK. STAT.
ANN. § 45-451 (Supp. 1983).
115. 427 U.S. at 334.
116. A delinquent juvenile is defined as any juvenile who has committed an offense ex-
cluding traffic offenses which, if committed by an adult, would subject such adult to prosecu-
tion for a felony, misdemeanor, or violation. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 45-403(2) (1977 & Supp.
1983).
117. In 1981, the Division of Youth Services reported that the ten most frequent reasons
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The Supreme Court in North noted that courts of limited juris-
diction are courts of convenience, designed to deliver speedy and
inexpensive resolutions to minor offenses." ,8 Having previously rec-
ognized that, "[a] proceeding where the issue is whether the child
will be found to be "delinquent" and subjected to the loss of his
liberty for years is comparable in seriousness to a felony prosecu-
tion," 1 9 it seems highly unlikely that the United States Supreme
Court would apply such reasoning to juvenile proceedings.
In Powell v. Alabama 20 the Supreme Court stated that a legally
competent tribunal is one of the basic elements of the constitutional
requirement of due process. There is likewise implied in the court's
holding in North that a defendant, at some point in the process, is
entitled to be heard by a law trained judge. The court points out
that in the Kentucky system, the defendant may actually have the
case tried by a law trained judge in the first instance by pleading
guilty in the inferior court and appealing immediately.' 2' A defend-
ant who failed to appeal would, in essence, be waiving the right to
trial by a law trained judge.
The Arkansas juvenile code also provides for a trial de novo
before a law trained judge 122 but the similarities between the North
case and the Arkansas system stop there. A juvenile who pleads
guilty in juvenile court may well foreclose any possibility of appeal-
ing his case on the merits. Prior to 1945, Arkansas followed the rule
that an appeal of a guilty plea in an inferior court would lie only if
the circuit court allowed the defendant to withdraw the guilty
plea. 23 In 1945, an act 24 was passed to allow a defendant to appeal
a misdemeanor conviction to circuit court for a trial de novo even
for commitment to training school ranged from burglary, a felony, to disorderly conduct, a
misdemeanor, and included several offenses, theft of property, criminal mischief, theft by
receiving, which could have been either felony or misdemeanor, depending on the value of
the property involved. 1981 Division of Youth Services Ann Rep. 119.
118. 427 U.S. at 336. (quoting Colten v. Kentucky, 407 U.S. 104, 118-119 (1972).
119. In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 36.
120. 287 U.S. at 68.
121. 427 U.S. at 334. An appeal vacates the conviction in the inferior court, See KY.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 23.032 (Baldwin 1971); Ky. R. CIuM. P. 12.06.
122. Appeals from juvenile court are tried before a circuit judge, ARK. STAT. ANN. § 45-
440 (1977), who is required to be "learned in the law" with six years of experience. ARK.
CONST. art. VII, § 16.
123. City of Fayetteville v. Bell, 205 Ark. 672, 170 S.W.2d 666 (1943); Dudney v. State,
136 Ark. 453, 206 S.W. 898 (1918); Duncan v. State, 125 Ark. 4, 187 S.W. 906 (1916); Stokes
v. State, 122 Ark. 56, 182 S.W. 521 (1916).
124. Act of March 7, 1945, 1945 Ark. Acts 197; ARK. STAT. ANN. § 44-502 (1977).
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when the conviction was entered upon a plea of guilty. 25 However,
the Act provides for such appeals to be taken from municipal, jus-
tice of the peace, and mayor's courts. No provision is made for ap-
peals of guilty pleas from juvenile courts. The implication, clearly,
is that no appeal of a guilty plea may be taken from juvenile court
unless the circuit judge, in his discretion, allows the guilty plea to be
withdrawn. 26 Juveniles in Arkansas do not have the option of be-
ing tried in the first instance by a law trained judge since the juve-
nile court action cannot be bypassed with a guilty plea. A
conviction is a shocking price to pay for a trial before a competent
tribunal. Juveniles cannot, under current law, be assured of a com-
petent judge in the first instance even if they are willing to pay that
price.
Providing a trial de novo with the full panoply of constitutional
safeguards would be scant comfort to a defendant who had already
served his sentence. The defendant in North was entitled to bail
while awaiting his trial de novo,127 one of the factors which led to
the Court's holding that a defendant could not be convicted and
imprisoned after a proceeding in which the only available trial was
conducted by a lay judge. Juveniles in Arkansas are entitled to post
appeal bonds 128 but two facts must be considered before concluding
that an appeal bond is a satisfactory safeguard in this context. First,
the amount and conditions of the appeal bond are set by the juve-
nile judge. 29 The result is that a deprivation of juvenile's liberty
after a conviction by a lay judge may continue pending an appeal of
the appeal bond itself. Second, the distinction between adults and
juveniles is significant in this situation. Juveniles usually have no
money and their ability to post bond is completely dependent upon
the willingness and ability of parents and guardians to post bond for
them. 30 An appeal bond for even a paltry sum may operate as a
125. Act 197 of 1945 was actually an amendment to Act 125 of 1943 which provided in
part "That hereafter, when a plea of guilty has been entered before a municipal, justice or
mayor's court in any misdemeanor case, the Circuit Judge of the county may in his discre-
tion, for cause shown, and in the interest ofjustice grant an appeal to the Circuit Court from
the judgment of the lower court."
126. "Expressio unius est exclusio alterius," means the expression of one is the exclusion
of the other. See Hackney v. Southwest Hotels, Inc., 210 Ark. 234, 195 S.W.2d 55 (1946).
127. 427 U.S. at 335.
128. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 45-440 (1977).
129. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 45-440 (1977) provides in part: "Every juvenile shall have the
right to post an appeal bond in such amount and under such conditions as the juvenile judge
shall, in his discretion, determine."
130. There is some recognition of the problem of money bail for juveniles in the Juvenile
Code. A juvenile judge may only set money bail pending trial after a determination that no
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continuing deprivation of a juvenile's liberty.
The De Novo Review
The availability of an appeal de novo provided the basis for the
Court's holding in North that due process was satisfied. 13 1 In an
appeal de novo, the defendant receives a new trial in the reviewing
court. This process allows the defendant the possible advantage of
using the first trial as a discovery device. As the Court pointed out
in Colten v. Kentucky, 32 "Such proceedings offer a defendant the
opportunity to learn about the prosecution's case and, if he chooses,
he need not reveal his own."'' 33
The disadvantages of a trial de novo far outweigh the advan-
tages a defendant may have to discover the prosecution's case. It is
obvious that two trials cost more than one. These costs are borne
not only by the defendant, in the form of attorney's fees, but also by
the state which pays for judges, prosecutors, and other court person-
nel and services. In addition, if the defendant is indigent, the state
must pay twice for the defendant to be represented. Victims and
witnesses, as well as the defendant and the attorneys must make
multiple court appearances. The lower court cannot be reversed for
error when no review of the proceedings is available.134 Therefore
the only relief available to a defendant whose rights have been vio-
lated in the lower court is a second trial. A defendant who requests
a second trial risks receiving a harsher penalty if found guilty
again. 135
Arkansas provides an appeal de novo from juvenile courts to
circuit court. This appeal process has failed to protect juveniles
from judicial practices which are clearly prohibited by law. 136 It is
impossible to determine to what extent juvenile cases are being ap-
pealed de novo to circuit courts since the Arkansas Judicial Depart-
ment does not gather the information. Obviously, no appeal process
can protect a defendant's rights unless utilized. The circuit judge of
one judicial district recently reported to a legislative subcommittee
other conditions will reasonably insure the juvenile's appearance in court. ARK. STAT. ANN.
§ 45-421(h) (Supp. 1983).
131. 427 U.S. at 334.
132. 407 U.S. 104 (1972).
133. Id at 118.
134. See Ark. Cotton Growers' Cooperative Ass'n. v. Brown 179 Ark. 338, 16 S.W.2d 177
(1929).
135. Colten v. Kentucky, 407 U.S. 104 (1972); See also Strickbine v. State, 201 Ark. 1031,
148 S.W.2d 180 (1941).
136. See supra notes 59-78 and accompanying text.
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that he has heard only four appeals from juvenile court in a twelve
year period. 137 The mere possibility of an appeal on a record would
impart an air of accountability to juvenile proceedings.' 38
Although the Court in North never reached the question of
whether training of lay judges might be required under some cir-
cumstances, it noted that mandatory or voluntary training programs
are provided in many states for lay judges.' 39 The contrast between
Arkansas and one of the states mentioned by the Court is drastic.
Florida provides an extensive training program estimated to equal
79% of the hours required for a law degree"4 for its non lawyer
county judges. Upon completion of the training program the county
judges can sentence defendants convicted of misdemeanors. Arkan-
sas requires no training for lay judges in juvenile courts and very
little training is offered. In 1981 the Division of Youth Services
sponsored state-wide training sessions for all juvenile court person-
nel. The purpose of the training was to provide information about
extensive amendments to the juvenile code which were adopted in
1981. Six county judges attended. 4'
The Requirement of Judicial Neutrality
The Supreme Court has consistently recognized that due pro-
cess requires an impartial and disinterested tribunal. 142 An adver-
sary proceeding fails of its essential purpose without a neutral and
detached judge to weigh the facts presented. The neutrality of a lay
judge, who may tend to rely on a prosecutor's advice, 143 is suspect.
Consider then the "neutrality" of a judge who presents the state's
case in a delinquency proceeding. If "justice must satisfy the ap-
pearance of justice'" 44 and the mere supervision of the prosecution
creates an appearance of unfairness 145 then a judge must surely be
prohibited from assuming the role of prosecutor. Not only are
137. R. Williams, Circuit Judge, Judicial District 11, West, Minutes of the Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on Juvenile Court System, 5 (Aug. 3, 1983).
138. See In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 58.
139. 427 U.S. at 333 n. 4.
140. Treiman v. State ex rel. Miner, 343 So.2d 819, 825 (Fla. 1977).
141. Only those county judges who were actually presiding over juvenile court at that
time were invited to attend. Telephone conversation with Linda Dickerson, Division of
Youth Services (June 6, 1983).
142. See, e.g., Marshall v. Jerrico, Inc., 446 U.S. 238, 242 (1980).
143. In North, Judge Russell conceded that he relied on the city attorney for legal advice.
427 U.S. at 344 n.4 (dissent). See also Ryan & Guterman, Lawyer versus Nonlawyer Town
Justices: An Empirical Footnote to North v. Rusell, 60 JUDICATURE 272 (1977).
144. Offutt v. United States, 348 U.S. 11, 14 (1954).
145. Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33, 44 (1949).
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judges acting as prosecutors in Arkansas juvenile courts, probation
officers, who are supervised by the juvenile judges, present the
state's case more frequently than any other person. 46 Since a trial
de novo does not correct procedural errors, the practices go
unchecked.
CONCLUSION
An adversary juvenile justice system with due process safe-
guards has replaced the image of a fatherly judge administering be-
nevolent justice to wayward children. Yet jurisdiction over
juveniles in Arkansas remains in the hands of lay judges. Whether
the use of lay judges in delinquency adjudications is a denial of due
process to juveniles is a question which can only be answered by the
courts. A reform of the juvenile system would obviate the need to
ask the question. Vesting jurisdiction of juvenile matters in a court
of record with a law-trained judge would help to alleviate the arbi-
trary charging of juveniles in the adult system and the unconstitu-
tional practices which are occurring in juvenile courts in Arkansas
today.
146. See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
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